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Abstract 
 
Social scientific and humanistic research on synthetic biology has focused quite narrowly 
on questions of epistemology and ELSI. I suggest that to understand this discipline in its 
full scope, researchers must turn to the objects of the field—synthetic biological 
artefacts—and study them as the objects in the making of a science yet to be made. I 
consider one fundamentally important question: how should we understand the material 
products of synthetic biology? Practitioners in the field, employing a consistent 
technological optic in the study and construction of biological systems, routinely employ 
the mantra ‘biology is technology’. I explore this categorization.  By employing an 
established definition of technological artefacts drawn from the philosophy of technology, 
I explore the appropriateness of attributing to synthetic biological artefacts the four 
criteria of materiality, intentional design, functionality, and normativity. I then explore a 
variety of accounts of natural kinds. I demonstrate that synthetic biological artefacts fit 
each kind imperfectly, and display a concomitant ontological ‘messiness’. I argue that 
this classificatory ambivalence is a product of the field’s own nascence, and posit that 
further work on kinds might help synthetic biology evaluate its existing commitments and 
practices. 
 
Keywords: Synthetic biology, biological engineering, technological artefacts, natural 
kinds, ontology, classification 
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1. Introduction 
 
Synthetic biology has captured the attention of scholars from a complex of disciplines, 
including those concerned with the philosophical and social foundations, properties, and 
ramifications of this as-yet-nascent field of scientific, technological and engineering 
practice. The myriad analytic perspectives brought to bear upon synthetic biology most 
probably reflect this field’s own multi-faceted character. However, the profusion of 
humanistic and social scientific analyses has been quite narrowly focused upon those 
issues labeled as ELSI—ethical, legal, and social implications—as well as 
methodological, epistemic, and professional issues relevant to synthetic biology’s use of 
engineering principles, methods, and organizational strategies. Synthetic biology hopes to 
analyze, model, and construct biological systems for useful ends—it aims to understand, 
modify, and reliably manufacture predictably functional biological entities. As such, 
synthetic biology aims at the making of physical products. These material objects—
synthetic biological artefacts—have as much to reveal about the discipline as do the 
practices and epistemic pronouncements of its practitioners.  
 
Studying the objects of synthetic biology is a necessary project in philosophical and 
social scientific analyses of this burgeoning, but quickly-developing, field of human 
practice. Much as early science studies looked at ‘science in the making’, it is necessary 
to study ‘objects in the making’—objects in the making both physically and ontologically. 
Here I attempt precisely this—a first-look examination of synthetic biological artefacts. 
To do so, my argument explores the place of these objects vis-à-vis two kinds: those of 
technological artefacts, and natural entities. I take ontology to refer to that on the basis of 
which entities are rendered intelligible as specific things. I hold that such intelligibility is 
not independent of our collective classificatory practices. Setting kinds and classifying 
objects into such kinds are ontological activities. Thus studying ‘objects in the making’, 
which involves studying their ontology, demands a look at kinds. 
 
A study of things and kinds in synthetic biology is of value for various reasons. First, 
synthetic biology styles itself as an engineering discipline: it frames its products as 
technological artefacts. Biological systems are abstracted and schematized as electronic 
systems; organisms are epistemically represented as mechanistic entities; synthetic 
biological artefacts are to be produced following methods and aims standard in traditional 
engineering disciplines. It is of value to evaluate such claims. Second, synthetic 
biological artefacts are physical tokens of the field’s practices, its practitioners’ aims and 
epistemic-ontological commitments, and its relation to broader social institutions of law, 
regulation, and ethics—all key interests to analysts of synthetic biology. Much as the 
burgeoning knowledge claims of a nascent science can shed light on that field’s character 
and development, undefined and incipient groupings of objects can elucidate the 
trajectory of new engineering practices. Synthetic biology is young; tracking its things 
and kinds may serve as a useful method to capture the field’s maturation. Last, specifying 
the character of the artefacts in question serves a number of pragmatic ends for analysts 
of synthetic biology. In gauging their status as particular tokens of a kind, sociologists 
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and philosophers may discover useful analytic tools from related studies of biology, 
technology, and engineering, or identify where such tools fail to provide any insight. 
 
One researcher typically employs the mantra ‘biology is technology’. Such statements are 
rhetorically powerful, but ontologically problematic. How are we to deal with this class 
of objects? This article is not a definitive resolution of this question, but rather a first-
look attempt to engage this topic and a spur to further study on the objects of synthetic 
biology. I begin by exploring synthetic biological artefacts’ place within the kind of 
technological objects. I argue that four key criteria—materiality, intentional design, 
functionality, and normativity (see Kroes & Meijers 2006)—are applicable to synthetic 
biological artefacts, although not without complications. I then proceed to consider a 
variety of definitions of natural kinds, and similarly demonstrate that synthetic biological 
artefacts only imperfectly fit such accounts. This ontological ‘messiness’ suggests that 
synthetic biology as a field is still searching for its kinds. Synthetic biological artefacts 
are the objects in the making of a science yet to be made. 
 
2. Synthetic biology: An overview 
 
Synthetic biology is notoriously difficult to define (see Benner & Sismour 2005; 
O’Malley et al 2007; Arkin et al 2009). It is a field of practice that seeks to apply 
engineering principles to reconfigure existing biological entities and processes or create 
de novo entities for useful purposes; it is also concerned with understanding the workings 
of microscopic nature through the process of building that very nature. That is, it seeks to 
create useful biological organisms, as well as to comprehend and model the action of 
natural entities. It draws together biologists, chemists, physicists, computer scientists, and 
all manner of engineers. 
 
Despite this pluralism, I suggest that synthetic biology—in its various forms—rests upon 
a single concept: design. Synthetic biologists aiming to construct functional biological 
artefacts seek to design nature; synthetic biologists whose goal it is to comprehend 
existing organisms and processes seek to find their ‘underlying’ design. This focus on 
design leads many synthetic biologists to suggest—following engineers—that to 
understand an entity is to be capable of constructing it. Understanding and construction 
are seen as partnered practices in synthetic biology. 
 
As with all nascent fields in science and engineering, synthetic biology displays a 
cacophony of research agendas, methodological commitments, ontological and epistemic 
standpoints, and disciplinary principles, norms, and expectations. For instance, Craig 
Venter’s research program has focused in part on ‘stripping down’ the genome of M. 
genitalium in order to arrive at the so-called ‘minimal genome’—one freed from excess, 
unnecessary, or redundant genetic material (Glass et al 2006). His team’s aim is to 
construct a ‘chassis’, an organism that can be ‘booted-up’ with any designed genome 
(Ball 2007). Jay Keasling’s laboratory at the University of California, Berkeley, modified 
E. coli and yeast to develop organisms capable of producing chemical precursors to the 
anti-malarial substance artemisinin (Keasling et al 2007). Rather than attempt to construct 
a biological platform for genetic constructs, Keasling’s group modified an existing 
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organism and tasked it with a human-defined function. Other laboratories are working on 
developing biological systems with the capacity to operate as electronic logic gates, 
switches, and memory devices (Gardner et al 2000; Burrill & Silver 2010). Finally, the 
Synthetic Biology Engineering Research Center, through its BIOFAB—a ‘public-benefit’ 
biological manufacturing facility—hopes to develop and characterize biological ‘parts’: 
modular units for biological construction (Sanders 2010). These various endeavors attest 
to synthetic biology’s emphasis on design. If synthetic biology hopes to ‘make biology 
easier to engineer’ (Lentzos et al 2008), it intends to do so through intentional design. 
 
The principal distinction that differentiates synthetic biology from earlier forms of 
biological engineering—such as genetic engineering—is its commitment to employing 
accepted engineering practices (see Endy 2005; Andrianantoandro et al 2006; Heinemann 
& Panke 2006). Practitioners sometimes refer to earlier work in genetic engineering as 
‘craftwork’—laborious, ad hoc, and time-consuming. These same individuals hope to 
replace the ‘black magic’ of genetic engineering with the (hoped-for) systematic, reliable 
biological engineering of synthetic biology. 
 
While synthetic biology hopes to develop revolutionary technologies and radically 
transform human understanding and control of biology, it approaches these challenges by 
way of entirely non-revolutionary strategies. The practices and principles which underlie 
much of synthetic biological research are those of conventional engineering disciplines: 
abstraction of complexity (Endy 2005); standardization of design components (Arkin 
2008); and modularity and decoupling of operational elements (Hartwell et al 1999; Endy 
2005; Sauro 2008). These specific concepts are most closely associated with the 
‘BioBricks’ school of synthetic biology, although the broader community similarly tends 
towards technological/functional conceptualizations of organisms. Synthetic biology as a 
field premises and promises ‘engineerable’ nature1: materials, entities, systems, and 
events that can be modelled, modified, designed, and constructed intentionally. It aims at 
the making of things—those things and their kinds are the focus of this essay. 
 
It is necessary and important to recognize one characteristic of the objects under study 
here: synthetic biological artefacts are still very much ‘objects in the making.’ The 
technologies needed to design, assemble, characterize, and manufacture these objects 
have not been established fully, and success in making synthetic biological artefacts work 
has been limited. The construction of predictably functional organisms is an aim and a 
driving principle, rather than an accomplished reality. Accordingly, these artefacts are 
opportunities to consider the ramifications of a field that, like its products, has yet to be 
established fully.  
 
3. Are synthetic biology artefacts technological? 
 
Synthetic biology approaches biological entities as technological systems—it studies 
nature as an artefactual complex—and hopes to develop functional biological artefacts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Clearly, this ontological-epistemic standpoint is a controversial one, both within and 
outside the field. See Kwok 2010.	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technologically. What place these objects are to have within synthetic biology and as 
entities embedded in wider social life assuredly rests on their ontological status—a status 
constituted in relation to long-standing Western dichotomies between the world of the 
natural and the world of human artifice (see e.g. Schummer 2001; Keller 2008). As such, 
a first step in studying synthetic biological artefacts is to consider their fit within the kind 
of technological objects. 
 
By the term ‘synthetic biological artefacts’, I refer to the physical products of synthetic 
biological work. These include, but are not limited to, cellular ‘chassis’ (Rasmussen et al 
2004; Forster & Church 2006), genetically ‘stripped-down’ bacteria such as Venter’s M. 
genitalium (Glass et al 2006), modified organisms such as the Keasling Lab’s 
artemisinin-producing E. coli, ‘standardized’ biological ‘parts’ such as BioBricks, and 
combinations thereof. Not admitting ‘ground-up’ attempts to synthesize de novo 
organisms, most of these objects are created by modifying or mimicking existing 
organisms, biological processes, or biological materials. Put otherwise, the materials and 
entities with which synthetic biology engages are commonly understood to be natural 
kinds, despite synthetic biologists’ employment of a technological optic in analyzing 
them. 
 
Are these products of synthetic biology technological? This section proffers four criteria 
for membership in the kind of technological objects, and evaluates the applicability of 
each to the objects of synthetic biology. As I demonstrate, the four criteria—materiality, 
intentional design, functionality, and normativity—do not unproblematically map onto 
synthetic biological artefacts. Synthetic biological artefacts do not sit comfortably within 
the kind of technological things. This tension is the focus of my discussion below. 
 
The four-fold conceptualization of technological artefacts employed here stems from the 
‘Dual Nature Programme’ in the philosophy of technology (see Kroes & Meijers 2006), 
although I have amended a number of details. I believe it successfully encompasses both 
academic analyses of technology and common-sense notions of what constitutes a 
technological artefact. Most importantly, the four criteria engender more questions than 
they do answers, and suggest a number of directions for further study. 
 
3.1 Materiality 
 
First, all technological artefacts exist in space and time; they are physical entities. Unlike 
‘technological artefacts’, the term ‘technologies’ refers to a much broader class of social 
phenomena including knowledge, processes, techniques, and practices—including such 
things as computer models employed in studying natural systems. These are 
unquestionably important foci of study in their own right, and are inextricably involved in 
the development, design, manufacturing, dissemination, and usage of technological 
artefacts. However, this study focuses upon those artefacts that are fundamentally distinct 
in that they are material objects. This consideration may appear too simple an issue for 
prolonged discussion, but intuitive responses must not obscure the complexities or 
ramifications of this criterion. 
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Synthetic biologists aim to construct de novo organisms or substantially reconfigure 
existing ones. In either circumstance, they are employing physical materials and 
techniques to produce physical artefacts. Certainly, the scale and character of the 
materials and techniques differ substantially from those employed in the construction of 
say, a bridge or tower; nevertheless, scale and character serve to differentiate these from 
more commonplace construction methods, not to repudiate their physicality. Nucleotides, 
proteins, and bacteria exist physically, as do pipettes and Petri dishes. This observation is 
intuitive, but its manifold ramifications are not so. 
 
First of these is the issue of continuity. Conventionally, physical objects are understood 
to be continuous—spatially and temporally (Grandy 2007). The bridge in front of me is 
an object in part defined by its physical composition and its persistence in time. If 
physical or temporal continuity are violated, then generally we understand a physical 
object as no longer existent. This suggestion is problematic, and does not evade critique, 
but it does suggest a number of considerations of importance here. The making of an 
engineered bacterium involves a number of physical transformations, not least among 
these the material modification of its genome. Strictly speaking, the physical entity that 
was present before the synthetic biologist is no longer present: physical continuity has 
been violated. Does this discontinuity suffice to demonstrate that synthetic biology has 
given rise to a technological thing where previously there existed a natural one? It does 
not. (Elder 2007). 
 
Consider first the fact that all biological entities are in a state of continuous physical 
transformation. Bacteria—and people!—are born, grow, change dimensions, metabolize, 
self-repair, introduce and expel entities from within and outside, reproduce, and 
eventually cease to be. This is simply a condition of the natural world. Consider as a 
second foil to the continuity argument that few—if any—organisms are composed of 
simply ‘their own’ biological materials. Physicality is a complicated arrangement, not a 
plain continuity of material. Changes to this arrangement occur frequently, and do not 
signal the end of the entity—either physically or ontologically (Dupré & O’Malley 2009). 
Both of these considerations should not surprise the student of technology. Technological 
artefacts grow antiquated, their parts are replaced, and they depend on other artefacts and 
phenomena to operate; they are likewise not physically isolated entities, nor are they 
isolated from the vicissitudes of time (Ladrière 1998; Grandy 2007). 
 
The aim and end of these considerations is this: the change enacted by synthetic 
biologists upon their objects of research and construction cannot be simply physical or 
behavioral. If indeed these practitioners are in the business of making technology from 
biology, their products are technological artefacts by virtue of something more than just 
their physical existence and character, despite the fact that they do exist materially. 
 
3.2 Intentional design 
 
Second, all technological artefacts are purposefully brought into existence; they are 
intentionally designed. This requisite comprises both artefacts’ physical constitution as 
well as their operational guidelines (Kroes & Meijers 2006; Vermaas 2006). Generally, 
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natural physical entities are not considered entities purposefully brought into existence, 
thus ostensibly excluding those objects from this definition. However, farmed crops, 
racing horses, and laboratory rats are all examples of biological entities that can be 
considered to be brought into existence intentionally. Moreover, if synthetic biology aims 
to and might eventually intentionally design organisms, this second criterion becomes 
considerably more problematic. 
 
In synthetic biological practice, experimenters engage in the deliberate physical 
transformations of living organisms—say, by introducing new or modifying existent 
segments of an organism’s genome—with the intent of exacting a defined change in 
entities’ behavior. Practitioners may choose to disable particular sets of genes in order to 
curtail a specified behavior, or they may introduce foreign genes with the aim of adding 
to the organism’s behavioral repertoire. In either case, an intentional physical change is 
carried out according to a particular design aim. Often, this approach to synthetic biology 
consists of assembling ‘standardized’ biological ‘parts’ with the aim of making a 
functional organism. Experimenters select operating components, design a system, and 
intentionally construct it. As with much in synthetic biology, ‘standardized’ parts operate 
unpredictably, and designs often fail when constructed. Nonetheless, the aim of 
intentional design is fundamental to the field. Exerting rational control over the process 
of biological engineering—enabling systematic, intentional design—is a core value in 
synthetic biology, a principle underlying its expectations, and a practice it employs and 
hopes to perfect. Current research aims to empower practitioners with the tools necessary 
to carry out this kind of design. 
 
An affirmative response to the question of purposeful design results in two key 
complications. First is the problem of physical transformation. If synthetic biological 
artefacts are intentionally brought into existence, at which point are organisms brought 
into existence as artefacts? That is, when does the intentional construction of synthetic 
biological artefact qua synthetic biological artefact produce a definitive product? If an 
existing organism is being transformed, surely a natural entity that existed at one point 
must cease to be and a new, technological entity must begin to be. This difficulty is 
similar to the above problems with materiality, and is not one limited simply to 
technological artefacts produced with biological materials. The making of a stone hand-
axe is a relatively simple process, but identifying the moment at which chipping and 
sharpening give way from stone to axe is certainly not easy. Clearly, intentional 
modification of material is not enough (again). Some attribution of ‘artefact-ness’ is 
demanded. 
 
A second difficulty with intentional design is more exclusive to products of biological 
engineering, and finds no easy resolution here. Certainly, synthetic biological artefacts, as 
entities still possessive to some degree of natural biological capabilities and 
characteristics, are susceptible to the pressures of natural selection and the processes of 
evolution. A particular set of intentionally designed bacteria might be unique in their 
constitution and resemble their designers’ intentions maximally, but once generations 
begin to multiply, there exists the significant chance that some—if not all—entities will 
‘drift’ from the original design. It is no accident that one synthetic biologist refers to the 
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‘tyranny of evolution’ (Specter 2009). Clearly, the issue is linked to the problems of 
physical and temporal continuity, but it more precisely deals with the specific character 
of synthetic biological artefacts. Nevertheless, while synthetic biological artefacts may 
drift from their intended design, intentionally designed they are, and the second condition 
of technological artefacts is fulfilled as a result. 
 
3.3 Functionality 
 
Third, technological artefacts have functions; humans mobilize them in order to carry out 
particular tasks (Kroes & Meijers 2006; Vermass & Houkes 2006; Hansson 2006; 
Houkes 2006). They are employed in the acquisition of an objective. Without a sense of 
‘for-ness’, physical entities cannot be said to have functionality; without function, 
intentionally-designed objects are not technological artefacts. The attribution of function 
is at the core of synthetic biological work with natural entities and processes, and leads to 
an intuitive belief that synthetic biological artefacts should be understood as 
technological. However, the issue is not quite so unambiguous. The precise character of 
functions is a contested matter within the philosophies of technology (Preston 2006; 
Scheele 2006) and biology2. 
 
As with other technological objects, synthetic biological artefacts have function insofar as 
practitioners design, develop, and construct them in order to accomplish particular ends 
and users intentionally employ them toward those ends. Before continuing to a 
justification of this claim, an important observation is necessary. Of concern here is the 
notion of technological function, rather than that of function as a biological property 
linked to adaptation (Wright 1973), genealogy (Millikan 1984, 1999), fitness (Walsh 
1996), or systematic capacity and decomposition (Cummins 1975). Despite attempts to 
develop unified conceptualizations of technological and biological functions (e.g. Krohs 
& Kroes 2009), I retain a distinction for a series of reasons. This topic is explored in 
greater detail below; here, the role of technological function is central. 
 
The making of synthetic biological artefacts is the making of entities capable of 
achieving ends specified by practitioners. Ongoing work in biological ‘memory’—data 
retention and re-delivery—seeks to construct entities capable of storing specified blocks 
of data and subsequently releasing that data upon command (e.g. Ajo-Franklin et al 2007). 
The processes of intentional design, construction, testing, and manufacturing are all 
linked to the synthetic biological artefacts’ capacity to accomplish this function. A 
prominent synthetic biologist speaks of comparing synthetic biological artefacts to robots, 
insofar as the former, like the latter, can ‘do things’. Both in those synthetic biological 
artefacts that exist—such as Keasling’s artemisinin-precursor-makers—and those that are 
in development—such as entities that can quickly and cheaply produce bio-fuels (Savage 
et al 2008)—their ability to accomplish specified tasks (their function) is central to their 
promotion as ‘biological machines’ (technological artefacts). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  This	  literature	  is	  extensive.	  Useful	  collections	  on	  function	  in	  biology	  include	  Allen, 
Bekoff, & Lauder 1998, Ariew, Cummins, & Perlman 2002, and Buller 1999.	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In considering function, it is also necessary to address functional attribution and 
functional improvement. While some practitioners intend to construct entities from the 
ground up, or radically transform existing organisms and task them with entirely novel 
functions, many other synthetic biologists hope to make existing processes more efficient 
(Dougherty & Arnold 2009). Rather than introduce a previously non-existent process into 
an organism, they hope to engineer and ‘improve’ processes naturally present in the 
entity. As such, the transformation has been one in efficacy. Strictly speaking, can I state 
that the organism has been attributed a function? Yes. Function exists as a result of 
practitioners’ collective understanding and categorization of the entity as one possessive 
of function (see Author 2009). Function—like materiality and intentional design—
extends beyond the physical processes necessary to bring it into being. Function 
necessarily depends upon the physical, but it also demands contingent practices of design 
and use. 
 
3.4 Normativity 
 
Last, technological artefacts may be characterized as possessing a normative component 
in two senses. First, we routinely speak of agents using an artefact ‘correctly’ or 
‘incorrectly’; second, specific tokens of an artefact type are habitually categorized as 
‘good’ or ‘bad’ (Dancy 2006; Franssen 2006). Both of these commonplace judgments 
indicate the fundamentally normative quality underlying our interaction with 
technological artefacts. Moreover, this requirement proves a necessary element in the 
study of design criteria, production standards, and operational evaluation. This final 
criterion is the most problematic of the four; it is unclear whether synthetic biological 
artefacts display either form of normativity. Nevertheless, I believe that arguments can be 
proffered in support of an affirmative response. 
  
First, consider the role played by functional success. Normative evaluations necessarily 
draw upon function: a token is either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ at accomplishing a determinate end; 
someone is using an artefact ‘correctly’ or ‘incorrectly’ in relation to an intended goal. 
Technological function and technological normativity are bound together. Nevertheless, 
it is not self-evident that one can speak of ‘good engineered E. coli’. The aims and 
principles of synthetic biology, however, make such evaluation more appropriate than 
may be apparent initially. A synthetic biological artefact—an engineered biological 
entity—will satisfy or disappoint its designer to a variety of degrees, but ultimately it will 
satisfy or disappoint. Synthetic biologists routinely refer to things ‘working’ or ‘not 
working’. If the intended aim—the function—of a particular strain of engineered bacteria 
is to produce bio-fuel, these entities can succeed or fail in different manners. Succeed, 
perhaps, in producing bio-fuel at the desired rate, or fail by say, producing no bio-fuel 
whatsoever. More likely, some combination of success and failure will ensue: some bio-
fuel but not quickly enough, fast enough but not of a good quality, the process worked for 
the most part but did not achieve the desired result, etc. Switches and ‘flip-flops’—
biological equivalents of their electronic namesakes—may be ‘leaky’ and thus of inferior 
quality and performance to ‘better’ engineered ones. 
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Second, consider the standardization of biological ‘parts’. Those involved in 
characterizing and classifying biological ‘parts’—discrete sequences of DNA with 
specified capacities—apply engineering principles to measure their quality. Developing 
standard indexes of engineering parts demands subjecting each categorized object to a 
system of evaluation. As such, current work in synthetic biology is driven very much by a 
normative impulse—one linked to a systematic ordering of objects. Competing ‘parts’ are 
being judged by established and newly-developing engineering values and norms. While 
the methods of measurement are still under construction, they draw consistently upon 
notions of efficiency and functional success. 
 
A final consideration is that of use. Regularly, technological use is evaluated with 
reference to ‘correctness’ / ‘incorrectness’, ‘proficiency’ / ‘ineptness’, and so on. In 
synthetic biology, operational components can be employed ‘correctly’ or ‘incorrectly’. 
Synthetic biological ‘parts’, which are combined to form ‘devices’ (which, in turn, are 
combined to form ‘systems’), have particular uses and requirements. Not all ‘parts’ that 
function as promoters or terminators for a specific gene will work identically. Each part 
will work well only in a particular context. The use of a specific object of synthetic 
biological will be ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ given the particularities of the entity under 
construction. ‘Parts’ and ‘devices’ can be used well or not so. Surely, this is a normative 
evaluation. 
 
3.5 Technological biology? 
 
Synthetic biological artefacts fit the four criteria of technological artefacts, but they fit 
these criteria imperfectly, as might be expected intuitively. Categorizing synthetic 
biological artefacts as technological entities leaves a few things to be desired—both an 
analytic suspicion and a commonsense impression that engineered organisms must 
somehow differ from corkscrews, airplanes, and towers. This impression—that 
something is missing if synthetic biological artefacts are simply subsumed into the kind 
of technological artefacts—rests on a series of ontological issues. Most importantly, the 
entities under consideration are not devoid self-evidently of their place in the kind of 
natural entities simply because they have undergone modifications. Moreover, these 
objects carry with them a range of considerations not applicable to other technological 
artefacts. Synthetic biological artefacts are self-reproducing, self-repairing, and have the 
potential to ‘subvert’ their designers’ intentions through the process of evolution. Insofar 
as such considerations distinguish this class of things, further work on kinds is demanded. 
 
4. Synthetic biological things and natural kinds 
 
Synthetic biological artefacts are by no means prototypical technological artefacts, as 
hammers may be. There is both something missing and something more to these objects 
that makes their study a difficult process. It is possible to make a similar claim regarding 
their relationship to ‘the natural’. This section explores this problematic relation by way 
of several prominent accounts of natural kinds. I have selected essentialism, homeostatic 
property clusters, and promiscuous realism as the arguments to explore; these I take to 
represent the key analyses of natural kinds, and each provides an important insight into 
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synthetic biological artefacts. Ultimately, however, each fails to provide a full accounting 
of such objects. This discussion brings into focus the ontological ‘messiness’ of the 
products of synthetic biology. This ‘messiness’ suggests that synthetic biology, as a field 
still in the making, has yet to find its kinds, to place its objects within appropriate 
ontological orders. 
 
4.1 Natural kinds I: Essences and clusters 
 
It is useful to begin a consideration of natural kinds and synthetic biology with the most 
strict delimitation of what constitutes a natural kind. I take this position to be natural 
kinds essentialism. Wilson succinctly defines this position as follows: 
 
Natural kinds are kinds (rather than mere arbitrary collections) because the 
entities so grouped share a set of intrinsic properties—an essence—and natural 
(rather than conventional or nominal) because that essence exists independent of 
human cognition and purpose. (Wilson 1999: 188, emphasis original) 
 
According to this account, natural kinds are groupings of similar entities. Such groupings 
are justified by essential properties possessed by each member of the kind. Since such 
properties are independent of human intention and activity, the kinds are natural. Thus, 
the appropriate focus of enquiry is finding such essences. Wilson, again writing on 
essentialism, states: 
 
… natural kinds are individuated by essences, where the essence of a given kind 
is a set of intrinsic properties, each necessary and together sufficient for an 
entity’s being a member of that kind. (Wilson 1996: 304, emphasis original) 
 
Essential, intrinsic properties constitute necessary and sufficient conditions for an 
object’s belonging to a particular natural kind. What such properties may be is a 
contentious issue. Morphological similarities and genetic commonality both face the 
problem of heterogeneity. Members of species, which are often considered tokens of a 
natural kind, display morphological and genetic diversity. While common descent from 
an earlier species might satisfy the essentialist demand, phylogeny is a relational, rather 
than inherent, property. Moreover, it is an unsatisfactory criterion for the numerous 
species for which no genealogy has been established, or for which establishing such a 
history is not feasible.  
 
Characterizing synthetic biological artefacts as natural following this account faces all of 
these difficulties, along with several others. If we take essence to constitute either 
morphological or genetic similarity, genetically transformed entities cannot properly be 
classified within natural kinds. Consider the following transformation: the making of 
artemisinin-producing Escherichia coli (Keasling et al 2007). This alteration to the 
organism includes a genetic modification. It also involves a morphological change; the 
organism now produces particular chemicals not found in natural strains. Even if the 
organism is otherwise unaltered, it is markedly different from natural variants. Members 
of the natural kind Escherichia coli do not fluoresce.  
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However, the issue is not quite so simple. In every other respect, a transformed organism 
may be similar to its natural variants. It may possess every single necessary and sufficient 
property needed for membership in its kind, despite its possessing something additional. 
This difficulty becomes even more apparent where natural kinds are conceived as 
homeostatic property clusters (HPC). 
 
The HPC account of natural kinds shares with the essentialist account a concern for 
properties, but it incorporates a recognition of heterogeneity. Boyd writes: 
 
The natural definition of one of these homeostatic property cluster kinds is 
determined by the members of a cluster of often co-occurring properties and by 
the (“homeostatic”) mechanisms that bring about their co-occurrence. (Boyd 
1991: 141) 
 
There are no necessary and sufficient conditions. Natural kinds comprise groupings of 
entities that share some, but not all properties that define the kind. If there are ten such 
properties, one entity may possess traits 1, 2, and 8, where a second entity may have 2, 5, 
and 10. While properties may vary across members of the kind, their correlation is 
determined by natural causal mechanisms such that a dynamic homeostasis is the result. 
 
Now consider the case of our artemisinin-making Escherichia coli. Assuming its only 
modifications are the introduction of this chemical-making capacity and the genetic 
material responsible for that trait, the transformed organism may suit the HPC natural 
kind of which its natural variants are members. This suggests that genetically modified 
organisms may still be considered token of a natural kind—or at the very least, that they 
are not self-evidently excluded from such kinds. 
 
I believe the matter hinges on the question of homeostasis. The HPC account argues that 
natural kinds are historical. The homeostatic mechanisms that ensure the co-occurrence 
of properties are natural causal laws linked to evolution. Organisms share properties 
because “other members exhibit them” and because “there is a certain kind of historical 
link between the members” (Boyd, 1999: 68). Such a conception of homeostasis fails 
when technological properties are under consideration.  
 
That our transformed Escherichia coli display artemisinin-production is not a result of 
natural causal mechanisms. This is a trait introduced by intentional human activity. Its 
persistence is a result of continuous oversight by human agents. Moreover, there is no 
historical link between the foreign trait and those which may constitute the property 
cluster. While the latter may exist because of a natural homeostasis, the former does not. 
It is not there because of inheritance or genealogy; it is there because someone put it there. 
 
While synthetic biological artefacts may satisfy the property condition of the HPC 
account, they present complications for the homeostasis condition. Simply stated, 
synthetic biological artefacts display properties present for reasons entirely distinct from 
natural mechanisms of homeostasis. 
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That the organisms share properties with their natural variants is a testament to their 
problematic ontology. That they are subject to human-intentional causal mechanisms is a 
reminder that they cannot be simply subsumed within natural kinds. 
 
4.2 Natural kinds II: Promiscuity and pluralism 
 
A more promising framework for studying synthetic biological artefacts begins with 
Dupré’s notion of ‘promiscuous realism’, which is best understood as a “metaphysics of 
radical ontological pluralism” (Dupré 1993: 18). While ‘promiscuous realism’ fails to 
justify classing synthetic biological artefacts as members of natural kinds, it serves to 
make sense of ontological ‘messiness’. This section addresses the account in relation to 
natural kinds. The following section engages with its uses for my argument. 
 
Dupré’s concern is reconciling a realist account of natural kinds with the empirical reality 
of such kinds’ semantic and metaphysical variation. He describes his position as follows:  
 
The position I would like to advocate might be described as promiscuous realism. 
The realism derives from the fact that there are many sameness relations that 
serve to distinguish classes of organisms in ways that are relevant to various 
concerns; the promiscuity derives from the fact that none of these relations is 
privileged. (Dupré 1981: 82) 
 
Thus while natural kinds may exist, there is no single, privileged definition of what 
constitutes such kinds. Dupré’s focus is species. What may be the correct and useful 
species definition for a taxonomist interested in morphological similarity is not 
necessarily equally valid for an evolutionary biologist concerned with phylogeny. Neither 
is ‘better’. Both are useful in their respective domains. Importantly, this pluralism 
extends beyond the various spheres of scientific practice: 
 
The vocabularies of the timber merchant, the furrier, or over the herbalist may 
involve subtle distinctions between types of organisms; there is no obligation that 
these distinctions coincide with those of the taxonomist. (Dupré 1981: 81) 
 
Kind-setting is contextual and pragmatic. Below, I will argue that such kind-setting is a 
useful way to conceive of synthetic biology’s relationship to its products. First, it is 
necessary to discuss where Dupré’s ‘promiscuous realism’ fails to account for synthetic 
biological artefacts.  
 
The central difficulty is the framework’s realism itself. Although Dupré advocates 
ontological pluralism, he insists on the fundamental reality of similarity relations. Such a 
position is understandable. After all, Dupré’s concern is with practitioners whose goal it 
is to explore and explain natural entities and phenomena. Where similarity relations are 
consequences of intentional human activity, as with synthetic biology, such realism 
becomes problematic. A colony of artemisinin-making Escherichia coli has similarity 
relations between entities that are not independent of human acts. It may be pragmatically 
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desirably to establish a grouping of such organisms. This kind will involve natural 
organisms grouped by virtue of a non-natural property.  
 
Dupré’s ‘promiscuous realism’ is most relevant to the present argument where its 
ontological pluralism is emphasized, and its realism is considered to be a special case of a 
broader phenomenon.  
 
4.3 Disciplines, kinds and things 
 
The preceding discussion of synthetic biological things and natural kinds demonstrates 
that the problematic relationship that these objects bear towards a technological 
classification is also the case with respect to natural kinds. The things of synthetic 
biology do not reside without complication in either grouping. I term this classificatory 
ambivalence ontological ‘messiness’. It is not wholly clear where boundaries between a 
number of ontologies—natural organism, biological material, engineered natural 
organism, and technological artefact—can be drawn. I believe that employing Dupré’s 
work with pluralistic kind-setting has much to reveal about this complication. Namely, 
synthetic biology is a field and practice still searching for its kinds. In its ongoing attempt 
to consolidate its aims, priorities, and practices, synthetic biology is also trying to define 
the kinds of objects which it hopes to design and manufacture. The ontological 
‘messiness’ of synthetic biological artefacts is a symptom of the field’s developing 
character, its lack of a coherent identity, and its limited concern for conceptual problems. 
 
Dupré proposes a “metaphysics of radical ontological pluralism” (1993: 18), and draws 
emphasis to the pluralism inherent in kind-setting. That which is pragmatically or 
epistemically desirably for a particular community may be of no interest to another. 
There are no “universally decisive” desiderata which underlie the organization of things 
under kinds (Dupré 2001: 209). In a sense, fields of study must take a stand on kinds; 
these are not pre-given, nor are they self-evident.  
 
5. Setting a kind for synthetic biology 
 
Dupré gives to epistemic communities the prerogative of setting their kinds. Similar 
arguments are presented by Kitcher (1984), Brigandt (2009), and Keller et al (2003). 
Speaking to the issue of natural kinds, Hacking states: 
 
Kinds are important to the agents and artisans who want to use things to do things. 
(Hacking 1991: 114) 
 
This claim holds relevance beyond the matter of natural kinds. Kind-setting is of 
paramount importance to the pragmatics of countless practices. What a community wants 
to use, and what it wants to accomplish through that use, will help determine what kinds 
hold relevance for that community. De Sousa argues that the ‘Modern View’ of natural 
kinds rejects understandings of natural kinds that posit an ontological dependence to 
epistemology (1984). It is my position that ontology—and therefore kind-setting—
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depends not simply on epistemic needs and commitments, but methodological ones as 
well. What practitioners want to do, and how they want to do it, matters. 
 
Synthetic biology wants to use biological things to fabricate technological objects. In 
constructing synthetic biological artefacts, practitioners aim to make these objects as 
‘engineerable’ as possible. That is, they aspire to make them conform to practice and 
principles of engineering. Kinds in synthetic biology must take their form from these 
commitments, while at the same time acknowledging that which makes functional 
organisms different from hammers, automobiles, and towers. 
 
5.1 Building with biology 
 
Synthetic biologists aim to build. They hope to produce technological things. Ultimately, 
however, the substrate with which they intend to do so is of a qualitatively different 
character than that employed by say, civil engineers. Such engineers also draw upon a 
natural substrate. They employ purified natural ores, create girders from transformed 
molten metals, and erect bridges. This end product resides comfortably within the class of 
technological things. A bridge and the natural ores from which it ultimately originates are 
physically and ontologically distant from each other. Not so with synthetic biological 
artefacts: physical modifications are tenuous and limited, and ontological discrimination 
is by no means self-evident. Those qualities which keep synthetic biological artefacts 
tethered to the world of natural things are precisely what must inform this discipline’s 
understanding of its kinds. Here I consider two such qualities: self-reproduction and 
evolution.  
 
The matter of self-reproduction is fundamentally one of origins. Technological artefacts 
are purposefully brought into existence through processes of design and construction. 
Natural organisms are self-generating—one generation of a species brings into being the 
next generation. Technological artefacts do not reproduce; living organisms are almost 
always defined by their capacity to do so. The engineering of organisms for useful 
purposes—the making of synthetic biological artefacts—is not necessarily intended to 
curtail these entities’ ability to reproduce. After all, self-reproduction may prove to be an 
immensely useful property of synthetic biology biological artefacts. Nevertheless, such 
objects also have an origin in intentional human design and fabrication, as I discussed 
above. It thus becomes necessary to consider the place of both biological reproduction as 
well as intentional human making in the crafting of synthetic biological artefacts. What 
kind contains entities with concurrent natural and artefactual origins? 
 
It is possible to consider this dual form of origin as an ambivalence or tension between 
genesis and poiesis. Following Ladrière (1998), genesis denotes the origin of an entity 
through processes entirely independent from human agency, while poiesis designates 
intentional bringing-into-being of an entity through human practice. Synthetic biological 
artefacts arguably display both forms of origin, and consequently make problematic 
membership in either a natural or an artefactual kind. I believe that synthetic biology—as 
a practice in intentional design and construction—harnesses the mechanisms of genesis 
with a view to poiesis. That is, synthetic biology hopes to make of natural reproductive 
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origins systematized technological processes. This may appear like the reconciliation of 
two incompatible phenomena, but this is not the case. 
 
Consider that for millennia humans have employed natural reproduction to produce 
objects of value or interest. The domestication of animals, the breeding of such animals 
for competition, and agricultural breeding for quality and yield have all involved the 
harnessing of natural reproduction for human ends and within artificial constraints. Our 
capacity to control such processes has been refined over time, but fundamentally, the 
question of origins persists. Synthetic biology is unique within this form of practice only 
insofar as it aims to make natural entities the products of systematic engineering practice. 
Otherwise, the tension in origins is identical. Synthetic biological artefacts are no more 
self-evidently technologies or natural things than are milk cows or championship race 
horses.  
 
The bringing-into-being of synthetic biological artefacts might be understood as 
‘constrained reproduction’. Ontologically, the entities that result from intentionally-
modified natural mechanisms resemble technological artefacts because their makeup has 
been altered and their origins have been constrained by human agency. That reproduction 
is a quality of biological things simply serves to differentiate the biological substrate 
from that employed by other forms of engineering practice. The co-presence of genesis 
and poiesis may form a fundamental basis for the making of synthetic biology’s kinds. 
After all, practitioners already employ the two in meaningful and productive ways. 
Synthetic biologists often employ ‘directed evolution’ (Andrianantoandro et al 2006; 
Dougherty & Arnold 2009), by which organismic change is brought about via a 
combination of both natural processes and human agency. That this option is available to 
practitioners distinguishes synthetic biology. The synergy of genesis and poiesis may do 
the same for the field’s kinds. 
 
Evolution poses a second complication. If synthetic biologists hope to predictably and 
reliably design and build functional living organisms, evolution is the inevitable rub. 
Entities subject to the pressures of natural selection may ‘drift’ from their designers’ 
intentions. While synthetic biology might eventually control the making of synthetic 
biological artefacts to a satisfactory degree, it may never develop the capacity to curtail 
the pressures of evolution. As such, synthetic biological artefacts present a problem not 
immanent to traditional products of engineering. 
 
Conventional engineering practices can ensure a high degree of physical and functional 
stability in their products, while synthetic biology is prevented from doing so by the very 
substrate it employs in making artefacts. This practical reality demands recognition, and 
has received some limited attention. Synthetic biologists have written on ‘evolutionary 
reliability’ (Canton, Labno, & Endy 2008) and have attempted to develop measures of 
artefact stability in terms of genetic change across generations (e.g. Canton & Labno 
2004). 
 
Note that while evolution is a unique consideration for this kind of building practice, drift 
and change are not phenomena exclusive to synthetic biology. Consider the process of 
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large-scale conventional manufacturing—the making of millions of tokens of an artefact 
kind. Inevitably, some token will fail to meet manufacturing standards of quality; some 
screws will be misshapen, some engines will have performance problems. It is entirely 
unsurprising to discover that manufacturing processes do not proceed flawlessly. 
Moreover, technological artefacts age with time and use. Engines require maintenance, 
new parts, and perhaps even complete overhauls. Vigilance against malfunctioning 
artefacts is a mundane facet of technological practice.  
 
The process of making synthetic biological artefacts may be entirely different—genesis 
made poiesis—but attention to malfunctioning tokens is no less important. The quality of 
synthetic biological tokens produced via genesis-poiesis is evaluated as is that of other 
technological artefacts: functional success. Should errors in cell division produce 
organisms incapable of operating as intended, practitioners would and do evaluate these 
as products that ‘do not work’, as objects with compromised performance (Canton, Labno, 
& Endy 2008). The onus is upon practitioners’ normative evaluations of functionality, as 
with all technological objects. Evolution may simply be a synthetic biological equivalent 
to human error, aging machine tools, and imperfect manufacturing procedures.  
 
As one researcher notes, everything has a ‘shelf-life’. Functional degradation is no more 
surprising in synthetic biology than it is in traditional engineering. The key difference is 
one of temporal scale. Synthetic biological artefacts may be functional for only a matter 
of days, where computers may last many years. It should be noted, however, that time 
scales of functionality already differ greatly within engineering. Products of electrical 
engineering may require replacement sooner than those of aeronautical engineering. The 
latter in turn are not constructed with the time-scale relevant to products of civil 
engineering, such as bridges or highways. The rapid change associated with synthetic 
biological artefacts may be an unavoidable facet of building with biology. If so, this may 
serve to distinguish the field’s kinds.  
 
5.2 Setting a kind for synthetic biology 
 
Following Hacking (1991), kind-setting matters for those who intend to do things with 
things. Synthetic biologists aspire to build with biology. Their aspiration points to a 
technological kind, while their substrate points to a natural kind. Consequently, neither 
class captures the character of synthetic biological artefacts, much less the subtleties of 
engineering with living materials. I posit that this complication in kind-setting reflects a 
broader dilemma for synthetic biology. 
 
As matters stand, synthetic biological artefacts are uncomfortably positioned as 
technologies. Practitioners have appropriated the language and practices of conventional 
engineering practices—design, modularity, standardization, and so on—as foundational 
guiding principles. As a consequence, their products are viewed as entities within the 
kind of technological objects. However, synthetic biological artefacts fit this kind 
imperfectly, as they do the kind of natural things. It is my contention that this imperfect 
status is a result of the field’s failure to study its kinds. 
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Synthetic biological artefacts may represent distinct tokens of a new kind—a grouping of 
things sufficiently distinct from natural entities and conventional technological artefacts 
to warrant a unique class. This possibility attests less to the novelty of synthetic biology, 
nor should it be considered a contribution to the excessive hype surrounding this very 
young field. Instead, my claim should be taken as a challenge to and question for 
synthetic biologists. Is conventional engineering the most appropriate model on which to 
pattern synthetic biology? 
 
Kind-setting is pragmatic. It serves specific ends. Classifying synthetic biological 
artefacts as tokens of existing technological kinds has clear ramifications for the making 
of these objects. If synthetic biology is to be successful in building with biology, it may 
have to accept that this form of human artifice is not reconcilable with traditional 
engineering. Its products may demand new and different methods, require new and 
different expectations, and serve unique ends. Alternatively, our understanding of 
technology may itself have to adapt vis-à-vis a new substrate of design and construction. 
The matter is an open empirical question. Answering this question may begin with an 
exploration of things and kinds. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This first-look analysis of synthetic biological artefacts focused on the ‘fit’ between these 
objects and two kinds: those encompassing technological things and natural entities. It 
was my intention to systematically study the appropriateness of applying these 
categorization to the material products of synthetic biological research. In doing so, I 
identified key areas of congruence as well as the central difficulties in studying 
engineered biology as either a technological or natural phenomenon. Beginning from a 
broadly accepted definition of technological artefacts, it has been shown that synthetic 
biological artefacts may be classed technological objects, but only uncomfortably so. 
Similarly, it has been shown that several prominent definitions of natural kinds fail to 
account for synthetic biological artefacts fully. This ontological ‘messiness’ suggests that 
synthetic biology may benefit by examining its kinds.  
 
Following Dupré (1981, 1993, 2001) and Hacking (1991), I argued that kind-setting is 
discipline-specific and serves pragmatic ends. Kinds follow the ontological-epistemic 
commitments, methodological practices, and goals of given fields. For disciplines lacking 
a consolidated body of practice, things and kinds are messy affairs. This is the case for 
synthetic biology. ‘Objects in the making’ are not dissociable from ‘science in the 
making’. 
 
To grasp the character of this discipline’s products is to comprehend the discipline itself. 
To track the objects of synthetic biology is to follow the development of the field. Things 
and kinds point to knowledge and practice. This essay has not closed the discussion on 
synthetic biological artefacts, but it has framed a problem needing further examination 
and offered a perspective on the current state of affairs. Synthetic biology has yet to find 
its kinds; synthetic biological artefacts are the objects in the making of a science yet to be 
made. 
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